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Ragusa Intelligence & Security (RIS) -




Ragusa (Dubrovnik), a city-state on the eastern Adriatic coast has organ-
ized one of the first intelligence organizations in history. Having no army
Ragusa's indipendence depended heavily on accurate and timely intelli-
gence gathered by its merchant, diplomats and scientists. Througout its
history as a indipendent city-state (from 14th to 19th century) Ragusa main-
tained its neutral position and ballanced between Austria, Venice,
Otoman Empire and other European powers having good diplomatic and
trade relations with all of them. The author's own research of the
Dubrovnik's archive show that good intelligence was critical for such a
policy enabling Ragusa's diplomats quick adapting to the new situations
and helping them "guessing right", and that is exactly what intelligence is.
A Surprising Discovery
In l972, while questioning why Communist politicians – Tito in
particular - failed to develop their countries to full potential, I con-
cluded that they failed because they suffered an “information defi-
ciency.” Governments need information to survive; that is, the
gathering, classification, and analysis of data.  Governments now
operate in the tenth Intelligence Revolution, one induced by the
democratic capitalist system.  Former CIA director, William Colby,
set out the revolution’s components:. National and International (i.e. NATO) Intelligence and
Security (I&S) communities.. Oversight and control bodies.. Science-based technologies. . Privatization of Intelligence; that is, corporations base
their RISS according to IBM 
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. Future I&S function:  population self-management 
To which can be added:. Individualization:  mass education, electronic media stim-
ulating inquisitiveness and creativity of individuals and social
systems.. Emergence of the “bridge-building” methods of science.
I&S has a past, but little written history. Unaware of emerging
global trends, historians generally ignored the I&S past.  One,
however, knew better.  T. Browald of Sweden’s Handelsbank,
wrote in The Way Ahead (l975) that “Three institutions in history
had the best intelligence: the British Empire, the Swiss banks, and
the Catholic Church”. However, one can add to these the tiny
republic of Ragusa, which, amid great powers often in conflict,
lived free for five centuries using a well-organized I&S system.
Ragusa was the name used for the Republic of Dubrovnik up
to 1806.  The Croat name Dubrovnik appeared first in a 12th
century document, but it was not generally used in European lan-
guages.
Ragusa in its world
Similar to Amalfi, Genoa, Pisa, Florence, and Venice, Ragusa was
a commercial city-state living by “intellegentia pecuniae queren-
do.”1 In the 7th century, when the Avars and Slavs destroyed the
Greek-Roman city of Epidaurus, some refugees settled on a near-
by rock (“laus” in Greek) which became over time Raus, Rausia,
and finally Ragusa. E. Carter, in his monumental Dubrovnik
(Ragusa): A Classic City-State (l975) shows that Ragusa from its
inception survived on shipbuilding and trade, exporting wax,
wool, and skins from the Balkans, and textiles, wheat, and luxury
items from the Mediterranean.
By l400, 8,000 inhabitants lived within its walls, today the
same  400 meters in diameter. Ragusans, now rich by trade, pur-
chased from the ruling princes an 80 kilometer strip of land along
the coast, having about 40,000 inhabitants. Until l190, Ragusa
had a Byzantine governor, and then a Venetian.  From l358 to
l806, Ragusa (managed by I&S) showed “Libertas” on its flag, the
only Dalmatian town free of Venice.
Ragusa’s government system was so similar to Venice’s that it
was called “scimia di Venezia”(a monkey irritating Venice).2
Venice’s protector was San Marco, and Ragusa’s Saint Blaise. Its
architecture and art were Italian, its official languages Latin, then
Italian.  Like Venice, Ragusa was governed by a prince, with a
Great Council, Senate, and a Minor (Executive) Council, all cho-


























Venice, and in Ragusa in l332. In 1359, Ragusa decentralized its
government; a rector limited in power was elected for a month; to
keep them apolitical, its bishop and Council secretary were
imported.  All government officials were elected by the Grand
Council, numbering l30 nobles in l358, twenty in 1806. 
The Ragusan Archives document , “Speculum Maioris Consilii
Rectores”, showed 4397 rectors elected between September
1440 to June  l806;  2764, (63 %) were from eleven “old patri-
cian” families:  Gozze, Bona, Caboga, Cerva, Ghetaldi, Giorgi,
Gradi, Pozza, Saraca, Sorgo, and Zamanya.  An 1802 list of
Ragusa’s governing bodies showed3 that 6 of the 8 Minor
Council, and 15 of 20 Grand Council members were from the
same 11 families.
Paradoxically, the armed powers at the time -  Serbia, Croatia,
Austro-Hungary, Venice, Spain, the Vatican, and, from l400 on,
Turkey, France, England, and Russia, were often in conflict or at
war with one another, but they comprised unarmed Ragusa’s
world trading partners.
Its Governing Doctrine
“ ’For example’ is no  proof”
Talmud
Ragusa prospered free in that world because its ruling families’
governing doctrines were based on its unique culture. Nikola Vito
Gozze, who served seven times as the rector of Ragusa, in his
Dello Stato delle Republiche, Venice , l591, lists 222 governing
rules; the following are typical: .It is better that a republic be governed by laws than by men.A prince by election is better than one by succession.Citizens of moderate means better love their Princes and coun-
try than the rich, who refuse to have anyone above them..To govern a republic, it is best to imitate the great god of
nature, who does everything little by little, almost unobserved
Above the door of the Senate chamber in the Prince’s palace
stands engraved “Obliti privatorum publica curate”(Forget private
interests (as you) manage public ones”). So until 1806, the repub-
lic had only three monuments to Ragusans. A stone tablet on the
Municipal building honors Nikola Bono, Ragusa’s  ambassador to
Istanbul, who in l678 died in prison for “our country’s freedom”
rather than to surrender to a Sultan’s demands.  In the Prince’s
palace, there is the l638 statue of Miho Pracat, a merchant and





















with a monument is Rudjer Boskovic. With “the consent of the
Senate”, a large marble table was placed in the cathedral a few
months after his death in 1787, praising his scientific achieve-
ments and “his help to the Republic”; he left at age 15, ‘promot-
ing its interests’, including in intelligence.”
Talleyrand, France’s foreign minister, defined Ragusa’s govrn-
ing policy (1806) as “Too weak to defend itself, Ragusa always
looked for foreign protectors.  Its system consisted of bending to
the will of the strong and passing through political events without
participating in them.”  In I servizi Segreti di Venezia (1994) P.Preto
describes Ragusa as “Door to the Orient for Christians, to the
West for the Turks; faithful daughter of the Roman church, and
friend of Catholic Spain; vassal of the Sultan, impartial distributor
of news to friends and enemies, and “doublespy” of the Turks and
Christians.”  Ragusa’s policy was “to have no friends or enemies,
only its own interests.” (Lord Palmerston,19th century.)  Thus,
P.Ricault, in his History of the Ottoman Empire (l670) described
Ragusa as “a follower of seven flags .”  The alleged saying “non
siamo Christiani non siamo Giudei, ma poveri Ragusei” is prob-
ably a Venetian invention.
In the wars and conflicts among its neighboring powers,
Ragusa remained totally neutral; in the l570 Lepanto battle,
Ragusa boats served on both sides. History records that “Ragusa
defended itself by diplomacy.”  But Ragusa’s diplomacy took
unusual forms; consider these written instructions by the Ragusa
government (1568) to its ambassadors heading to Istanbul:
“When the pasha tells you that the Sultan wants to increase our
tribute, fall on your knees, pour tears, and with most humble
words beg him to desist, for we have always been his good ser-
vant.” But the Ambassadors were also instructed to give the pasha
a bribe of 5000 ducats to support their tearful pleas.”4
Historians have constantly underestimated the I&S role in
Ragusa’s history. To survive in a hostile world, Ragusa, small and
unarmed, developed an unparalleled  I&S system . This paper is
a long footnote updating the excellent Ragusa (i.e., Dubrovnik)
histories of L. Vojnovic, I. Foretic, I. Mitic, Novak, Beretic,
Sundrica and others. I hope to illustrate (if not prove) the hypoth-
esis that few states in history had  more effective intelligence and
security system than the Ragusa republic; the proof is its ability to
remain free by skillfully adapting and by “guessing right”; i.e.,



























Ragusa  Intelligence & Security System (RISS)
“Every statement I make must be understood as a question”  
Niels Bohr
The document, “Reformationes” (Ragusa/Dubrovnik Archives)
records in Latin the birth of the first Intelligence and Security serv-
ice in Europe.5
On August 12, l301, the Senate  decided to choose able men
to be responsible for the fortification and security of the city of
Ragusa as they see fit and appropriate. The Senate also decid-
ed to choose in the same way good and competent men to
explore where they consider best, both  inside and outside
Ragusa’s republic, all information and to inform his lordship
the prince as necessary for the good and prosperity of the
state. 
The men responsible for these tasks were named and so sur-













I&S Organization and Process
How was the Ragusa Intelligence function organized, its person-
nel selected; how and from what sources was information gath-
ered and analysed; how were the results used by its government
and diplomats, and at what cost; was it kept secret from the
Venice governor until l358; what techniques were used?  On Feb
12, l348, the Senate ordered the Minor Council to assign five
“sapientes ad inquerandum et inestandum de novis” (five knowl-
edgable men for inquiry and confirmation of news) to gather intel-
ligence from Southern Italy and Sclavonia (Serbia). On Sepember
20, l348, the Senate elected 5 “pasatores” 6, one outside and
four inside the city.  In l737, a battle was fought between the131
Austro-Hungarians and Turks at the town of Banja Luka in Bosnia.
The action precipitated the following letter: 
The Prince and the Counsellors of the Republic
To the magnificent don Vicko Mrshe
our always beloved
in Chepikuche
Dubrovniik, 22 August, l737
Our  public service requires to have exact and detailed infor-
mation on all questions in the appended letter. In order to
have them exact and without a doubt, it is necessary that you
personally go to Ravno and record them there with prince Ivich
who, we are informed, was in the battle near Banja Luka and
has now returned home. You should confidentially question
him on all the listed  queries  and on everything else he knows.
You must strive to learn every detail  you consider important for
us.  If somebody else has returned from the army that you
know, also gather information from him in order to increase
your knowledge with the exactness you always use. Everything
you come to know will be received with special satisfaction.
We recommend you act quickly so that we can get the infor-
mation on all the listed questions in our letter. Nothing of this
would be useful without the caution you always show with your
own special style. Nothing more, but our greetings.
The list consisted of about l20 questions: for example, “How
many soldiers were there on the Bosnian side? How many Turks,
and how many Raya( non-Turks)? How many from Bosnia; How
many from Hercegovina? Who commanded the one and the
other? Who was the supreme commander? When did they come?
Where were the Austrians (Germans in the text)? If  the Germans
were at Banja Luka, in how many camps? Were both on one side
of the river or on both?”
The Archives contain many such questionnaires that Ragusa
sent to its “beloved” informers such as don Mrshe. 
Security
From its earliest days up to l806, the Ragusa government, always
vigilant, was particularly attentive to its security and intelligence.
Its first walls enabled it to resist a siege by Arab pirates in 880.
After l359, it began building its present walls, described by I.
Beretic:  “During the eleven centuries of its existence, the small
Ragusa (Dubrovnik) republic paid special attention to the fortifi-


























only for the protection of towns from enemy sieges, but for the
defense of its peasants from robbery by the neighboring feudal
lords and pirates.”  Beretic describes in detail who was responsi-
ble, how the labor force was recruited, and where materials were
obtained. Ragusans, aware of the invention of artillery, built the
magnificent Mincheta and Lovrenac towers and mounted several
hundred cannons on  the walls..
The foundation of Ragusa’s security was eternal vigilance and
close analysis of every situation.  The method is described by
Senator Junius Resti in his Chronica Ragusina: Ab Origine Urbis
usque ad Annum 1451:7 “In the political government of states and
especially of republics governed by old families, the basic princi-
ple has always been not to ignore anything suspect and with cau-
tion to proceed to the bottom of every case, in order to find the
appropriate remedies and arrive at one’s real interests securely
and with good results.” Such  vigilance resulted in counterintelli-
gence operations; Resti again:  “In l529, Francesco Silvana of
Macerate, for many years secretary of the Republic of Ragusa ,
was tried for treason in an important case and garrotted in
prison.” Ragusa also used other means. On April l3, l665(?), the
Senate of the Republic, by a 35-0 vote, approved the use of  poi-
sons obtained from  Florence.  Soon after, the Ragusa Italian bish-
op suddenly died, and was mourned by the Senate.. 
Ragusa’s “Eyes and Ears”
Such analysis as described by Resti was certainly based on infor-
mation from all parts of Ragusa’s world, using its human and
technical “eyes and ears”8.  My summary exploration of the
Archives showed that Ragusa used the following “eyes and ears”: 
Consuls
As described by I.Mitich, Ragusa had its first consul in Brskovo,
Italy in l250; by l589 it had 44:  40 in Italy, 3 in Spain, and 1 in
France. The Archives contain literally thousands of communica-
tions between the government of Dubrovnik and its consuls; for
example, on September 9, l698, the Senate thanks L. Barca, the
consul in Istanbul, for news on peace negotiations, and asks for
additional information. On May11, l700, the Senate asks its con-
sul in Durazzo, Albania, why Turkish troops are being assembled
and where they will be sent. Zivojinovich writes ( see bibliography)
that in l780 “Dubrovnik diplomats and consuls had well informed,
and had sent to the Senate detailed reports related to the war























One of the most interesting consular reports to the Senate was
from “F. Favi, Agente”, sent in Paris (July 23, l783).  It writes: “The
predictions of the best informed politicians are beginning to be
fulfilled; that once free, America would absorb Europe.  For there
is considerable emigration in that direction.  Already it is estimat-
ed that ten thousand Germans have left from Hamburg, Holland,
and Ostend to settle there. An English and Hamburg merchant
company has sent three boats to America, full of German emi-
grants.”  Favi gives statistics on the kinds of individuals who are
emigrating to America and why.   They are skilled in a variety of
professions and dissatisfied with European political and econom-
ic conditions.  His report is an example of  the best kind of intel-
ligence, defined by Aristotle in his Nichomachian Ethics 330 BC.,
as “the capability to perceive meaning in detailed information”.
From documents in the Archives, I. Mitich concludes that “The
Dubrovnik consuls sent up to date, precise, and relevant informa-
tion about political, military, and commerial situations.  On the
basis of such reports, the government of Dubrovnik (Ragusa)
could make the required decisions and take positions in specific
conflicts to maintain its neutrality and thus advance its commercial
interests”.
Trade Colonies
Ragusa had trade colonies in many towns in nearby Bosnia,
Istanbul, and Sofia.  Among the most important was that in
Belgrade. The merchants there were the  “eyes and ears” of the
Ragusa government.  Thus, on October 28, l558, the Ragusa
government informed the king of Spain that “Our agents in
Belgrade write that his Highness, the Grand Turk, is preparing for
war in Hungary to start next Spring. Thus we learn that all local
governors have been ordered to prepare food and other materi-
als and assemble them in Belgrade.”  The merchants from the
affected colonies informed Ragusa that the Belgrade Ragusa mer-
chants (in a letter of November 15, 1681) agreed to buy skins
jointly at the same price, because of  a shortage (see Figure 1). 
Village captains
Nobles of l8 years of age and older were elected as village chiefs.
Dozens of messages were exchanged between the captains from
Trstenica and the Ragusa Senate between l577 and l665 (Doc.
and Acts XVI, no 450 of the Archives):
…Captain B.Martinovich writes from Trstenica that on October
23, l570, a Venetian galley arrived on the island of Korchula
with news of the battle of Lepanto on October 7 between the
Turkish and Christian fleets.
…Captain Tomo Basiljevich writes from Trstenica that he received






























































and one by land) for himself, and for the captain on the island
of Lastovo.He warned the local inhabitants to inform him
about the fugitives.
…An October l6, l665 secret decision by the Senate orders the
Trstenica captain V.Skopich to learn from D. Andjelkovich, the
chaplain on Korchula, who from Dubrovnik is sending reports
to the Venetian naval Commanders in Korchula. 
Ambassadors
Ambassadors were sent every two years to Istanbul with a tribute
of l2,000 ducats.  Their detailed orders, given orally and in writ-
ing, instruct them as follows:  “In your travels or at the Court (in
Istanbul), if something happens that you consider important, we
order you to inform us, and not to spare horse couriers, for we
shall pay them . Be cautious in sending them.”
Ambassadors were to find and use “our” people; that is, court
officials native to Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia who spoke “our”
language. One friendly to Ragusa was the grand vizier in the
Sultan’s court, Mehmed pasha Sokolovich.
In its instructions to ambassadors, the Senate lists the officials
at the Istanbul court who must be given presents.  In one, howev-
er, the Senate singles out one to whom nothing should be given,
for he has reneged on his promise to help. Ragusa’s
Ambassadors, consuls, and government officials often used
bribes.  An old Ragusa dictum was, “Against  those who threaten
us with  iron bullets, we use gold bullets “.  Another was “Polite
with everyone, sincere with no one”.
Ragusans  Abroad.
I. Mitic (page l28 of his book): ”In addition to her consuls and var-
ious special  envoys, the Dubrovnik Republic used prominent
natives to perform important services in the capitals in Europe.
They informed systematically the Dubrovnik Senate about military,
political, and other events and trends.”  Among the natives of
Dubrovnik occupying important positions abroad was R.
Boshkovich, who left Dubrovnik at age l5 to become a Jesuit in
Rome and came back to Dubrovnik for only one short visit. The
Senate began asking his help in l755, while he was still in Rome,
and continued asking until his death..”  Boshkovich became the
de facto Dubrovnik ambassador in Paris, informing on events in
France, including an assessment of the personality of the new
king, Louis XVI. In his letter to the Senate (l781), Boshkovich
includes an article from the “Gazette de Leyde” interesting to
Dubrovnik businesses in Morocco. He regularly sent the “Courier
de l’Èurope”. In the same letter, he speaks of the mismanagement
of Dubrovnik businesses in Marseille, citing the incompetence of
its consul there. In l781, Boshkovich wrote that he could no longer136
send letters to Dubrovnik, for he had been appointed chief of
optics in the navy of France and was required to take French citi-
zenship. In reply, the Senate of Dubrovnik sent Boskovich a spe-
cial code to use in the future.
Journals
In the late 1500s, newspapers appeared first in Venice, then
in other countries.  The Ragusa government perceived their impor-
tance to intelligence and security. In the l8th century,  the Senate
received the following newspapers: “Gazetta di Toscan” from
Livorno; “Notizie del Mondo” from Venice; and the “Gazette de
Leyde” from Holland.  And the Livorno Consul sent “Gazetta di
Notizie” and the “Gazzeta delle Correnti Notizie.”9
Uses of RISS
Ragusa used the information to solve specific political problems
and to obtain the good will of the surrounding powers.  The
Archives also contain evidence of Ragusa’s technological intelli-
gence effort; for example, the appearance of artillery, shipbuild-
ing, and information.about economic changes in the
Mediterranean after the discovery of America.  
The l602-5 Lastovo island rebellion and occupation by Venice
illuminates the Ragusa Republic’s use of diplomacy based on first-
class intelligence. The inhabitants of Lastovo rebelled in l602 to
defend their traditional rights; Venice then occupied the
island..Well-informed of the attitude of the dominant
Mediterranean powers concerning the Venetian occupation,
Ragusa, applying diplomatic pressure, asked Venice to withdraw
from Lastovo.  As reported, the Sultan told the Venetian ambassa-
dor to Istanbul “If you don’t ask Venice to retreat from Ragusa’s
territory, I’ll have your head cut off” Venice left Lastovo in l605.10
To gain their protection, Ragusa routinely fed intelligence to
all the surrounding powers, even in times of conflict and war.
Evidence of this is the only study of Ragusan intelligence written in
Croatian during the Communist regime. The Trstenica captains’
messages were from Archive documents found by the Tito police.
Historian V. Chaldarevich, who was close to the Communist Party
of Bosnia, published in “Narodna Milicija” No 7-8, l958, a sur-
vey of Ragusa I&S, under the title: “Dubrovnik: the Center of
Europe’s Intelligence Service.”  The paper concentrated on
Ragusa’s use of intelligence to obtain the goodwill of its potential
protectors .11
In order to have the exclusive use of intelligence, the Senate
(an ordinance of  Dec. 28, l526) forbade the sending of informa-137
tion about the Turks abroad; “Those found guilty, whether noble,
plebeian, or priest, will be fined l00 gold ducats or sentenced to
six months in prison.”   In addition to Chaldarevich’s paper,
researchers in the Archives of the Vatican, Istanbul, Madrid, and
Vienna found evidence of Ragusa’ s providing intelligence to the
powers, as shown in the following table.  (Two historians from
Dubrovnik perceive the current importance of intelligence:
Sundrica in l999, and Bilich in 2000. Other history students in
Croatian universities, once aware of the current I&S revolution,
will certainly study the rich Ragusa I&S tradition). 
Ragusa Supplying Intelligence to its  Protectors at War with each
other Austria, Turkey, Spain, Vatican
To Louis, the King of Austria, l6 May 1373
The Senate of Ragusa: “We the sworn servants of your majesty are
bound by duty to inform you of everything we learn that the
Venetians are doing against your lands”.
To the Sultans of Turkey Bayazit II, 7 April 1495
Thanks Ragusa Senate for the information that his brother Dzem
has died in Rome and requests further information.
Suleiman I, 31 December l530
“I have ordered that henceforth you shall not interrupt the flow of
your information nor cease to find out from the troops of the dust
like infidels from them what their absurd thoughts and guesses
are.”
To the Sultan, 11 November l570
“Twelve galleys of the Pope have united with 49 of the King of
Spain and have passed Corfu to unite with the Venetian fleet at
Candia, altogether l85 large galleys forming a league”.
To Carl V of Spain12
From the Senate through A.Djurasevich, the Ambassador in
Madrid, January 13, l545:
“We received a letter from our agents in Istanbul requesting
our regular tribute, since the Sultan and his army are going to
Persia.  Tell the Emperor, ’We inform Your Majesty of this so that
you know that we are always devoted to you’.”
To the Vatican: l606-l660
Source: I. Duichev, “Avvisi di Ragusa”, l935
138
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12, January, l607: In Istanbul, the great Vizier Dervish-pasha
has been killed and replaced by Nurach-pasha
23, May, l646:  The Senate is informed of the sudden depar-
ture from Istanbul of 20 war ships and arrival of gunpowder and
guns from Belgrade.
26, August, l648  The Sultan has lost the throne and his life;
the new Sultan is Muhamed, son of the late Ibrahim.
.
RISS:  Model for the 21st Century
“Do not laugh: it is I who anticipate the future and know its thought”
D. Diderot 
Our insights about the future can help us discover the past.  I
found a number of predictions by farsighted thinkers regarding
our intelligence revolution.  For example, in the l920s, Walter
Lipmann, observing the proliferation of knowledge, foresaw the
emergence of organized intelligence.  J. Dewey offerred social
intelligence as the alternative to laissez faire capitalism and total-
itarianism. Theillard de Chardin also intuited the emergence of
our intelligence era: observe, the ABB corporation advertising its
“Brainpower”; the Warburg Bank its “Global Intelligence”;
Microsoft its “Intelligent Information”;  IBM its “Intelligence
Program”; Stockholm city its “Municipal Intelligence Department”,
consultant Anderbjörk his “Community Intelligence Services”;
Robert Steele his “Open Sources Public Intelligence”.
Is Ragusa’s I&S relevant in today’s intelligence environment?
More than six billion individuals who occupy as many social sys-
tems, towns, corporations, and organizations are following the
Ragusa model; that is, adapting creatively to a fluid environment.  
Our world will be based on an enlightened  “New Deal” cap-
italist system.  In l930s, when the U.S. suffered a depression,
Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the “New Deal” to improve the
welfare of broad sections of the population, and to create the pro-
duction for their needs.  Today, the “new deal” will again emerge
as a result of mass-production capitalism. Henry Ford introduced
mass production capitalism in 1916, when he realized that his
workers could not afford his automobiles. Mass production in for-
mer Communist and undeveloped countries will bring about a
better life, one based on employment, good working conditions,
education, health, and freedom.
Ragusa’s use of I&S to remain free is a paradigm for social
systems in our world beset by complex global problems.  I hope
that professional historians will inform the public of the unparal-
leled I&S experience of Ragusa/Dubrovnik.
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NOTES
1 Middle Ages Latin proverb: intelligence of making money. 
2 Serafin Cerva, Dominican priest, in his history of Dubrovnik (1744) writes:”Venetorum
regendi formamimitati sunt Ragusini”( “The form of government of Venice is imitat-
ed by the Ragusans”).
3 I.Mitich, (in Croatian). Dubrovnik State in the International Community, 1988.
4 “Lettere di Ponente”, ICC 81-89.
5 Venice’s “Committee dei Dieci”, its intelligence and security body, was formally estab-
lished in 1340, according to Preto.
6 P.Preto published a paper , a dictionary of terms for the I&S personnel in Venice.
7 Published in Zagreb by the Yugoslav Academy of Science, 1893. 
8 S. Dedijer,”British Intelligence-The Rainbow Enigma”, Int. Jour.of Intell. &
Counterintel.”Vl, N 2, 1986.
9 see D.Zivojinovic, Amerièka Revolucija i Dubrovaèka Republika, 1763-1790.
10I have been informed that in the Archives here, there are hundreds of documents on
the Lastovo case. My source is the first chapter of  Samardzich’s book. 
11 I was unable to find the article in Yugoslavia, but  found it in the Library of Congress
in Washington, and presented  it to the Archives.
12 M.P.Bovich,”Entre la Cruz e la Media Luna, Ragusa intelligence to the court of the
Republic of Spain about the Turks in the l6th Century” (in Croatian and Spanish),
Zagreb 2000.
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